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Violinists Run Amuck in South Dakota:  Screen Doors Down in the Badlands! 
 
[I]magine this. You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in 
bed with … [a] famous unconscious violinist …. the Society of Music Lovers 
has … found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore 
kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into 
yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well 
as your own …. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's only 
for nine months. By then he will have recovered … Is it morally incumbent on 
you to accede to this situation?... What if it were not nine months…  What if the 
director of the hospital says, "Tough luck, I agree, but you've now got to stay in 
bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life. Because 
remember this. All persons have a right to life… Granted you have a right to 
decide what happens in and to your body, but a person's right to life outweighs 
your right to decide what happens in and to your body. So you cannot ever be 
unplugged from him." (Thomson: 48-9) 
 
I. Introduction 
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion” was published in the first ever issue of 
Philosophy and Public Affairs (vol. 1, no. 1, 1971, 47-66).1  It is quite likely that, not only 
is it the most widely reprinted and cited essay ever to appear in that journal, it is also one 
of the most influential academic essays ever to appear on the topic of abortion.2  Almost 
every serious discussion of abortion in Anglo-American philosophy has made some 
reference to the essay, and to Thomson’s central argument in it, since the essay was first 
published. 3  Perhaps more students have read, and so to some degree have been 
influenced by, Thomson’s essay than any other on this topic.  It was welcomed by some 
pro-choice advocates as an original and sound defense of the morality of at least many, 
though by no means all, cases of abortion.  There was, however, something in it for anti-
abortionists too. For, given its starting point (the assumption that a fetus is a human 
person), Thomson argues that many cases—perhaps most—are, in varying degrees, 
                                                 
1 Readers should stop in their tracks and read Thomson’s essay before continuing. 
2 The most important responses to Thomson’s essay include David Boonin-Vail (1997a and 1997b), Baruch 
Brody (1972), Nancy Davis (1984), John Finnis (1973), Doris Gordon (1999), R. M. Hare (1975), Rosalind 
Hursthouse (1991), F. M. Kamm (1992), Marguerite La Caze (2002), Steven L. Ross (1982), Michael 
Tooley (1983), and Mary Anne Warren (1973).  
3 See La Caze, M. (2002) for a compelling and nuanced account of how the central image of Thomson’s 
essay works, both in the essay itself and through its reception history. 
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immoral.  It is in view of the recent legislation passed in South Dakota, along with the 
religious and political right’s clamour for a near total ban on abortion that we wish to 
reread Thomson’s essay.4  
Here is the thesis. Thomson’s defense exacerbates anti-abortionist prejudices by 
assuming the humanity or personhood of the fetus, its right to life, and framing the issue 
in terms of a clash of rights.  Framing the debate in this way has a number of highly 
unfortunate consequences.  It has the effect of legitimating anti-abortionist rhetoric and 
drains the issue of its moral particularity.  In the wake of Thomson’s article, though not at 
all wholly the result of the article, general philosophical discussion of abortion has failed 
to focus on the moral response to circumstances and experiences unique to women, but 
has become, largely, a generic rights issue.  Thomson attempts to carefully set out 
limitations to a women’s responsibility for the life of a fetus; but she does so always in 
the context of the rights of a fetus.  Overemphasis on rights talk accentuates rather 
mitigates feelings of guilt on the part of those who would obtain an abortion, and it fans 
the fires of prejudice in the guise of moral outrage.   
In the essay, Thomson seeks to defend the morality of certain abortions even if the 
fully-fledged right to life of the fetus is accepted.  She takes as her starting point the claim 
that “the fetus has already become a person well before birth”5 (47).  And, using a number 
of carefully constructed analogies, seeks to demonstrate a general thesis about rights.  
                                                 
4 Evelyn Nieves, Washington Post Staff Writer Thursday, February 23, 2006; Page A01. “S.D. Abortion 
Bill Takes Aim at 'Roe': Senate Ban Does Not Except Rape, Incest” 
“South Dakota lawmakers yesterday approved the nation's most far-reaching ban on abortion, setting the 
stage for new legal challenges that its supporters say they hope lead to an overturning of Roe v. Wade. The 
measure, which passed the state Senate 23 to 12, makes it a felony for doctors to perform any abortion, 
except to save the life of a pregnant woman … The bill was designed to challenge the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Roe , which in 1973 recognized a right of women to terminate pregnancies. Its sponsors want to 
force a re-examination of the ruling by the court, which now includes two justices appointed by President 
Bush.” 
5 Thomson says (47-48) “Indeed, it comes as surprise when one first learns how early in life it begins to 
acquire human characteristics. By the tenth week, for example, it already has a face, arms and legs, fingers 
and toes; it has internal organs, and brain activity is detectable.” Why is any of this an indication that the 
fetus “has already become a human person well before birth?” 
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This is the thesis that a right to life does not entail a right to life-support.  A right to life-
support, where it exists, must be the product of a moral relationship other than 
dependency.  Thus one cannot infer from the fact that a fetus has a right to life and is 
wholly dependent upon its mother that the mother has an obligation to continue to provide 
the fetus with life-support. This is all that Thomson can show, if indeed she can show 
even this, by the use of such analogies as the famous violinist (above) or the astonishing 
image of a cloud of “people seeds” floating uninvited through one’s window and taking 
root in the carpet (Thomson 59)  Such a general thesis about rights and how they interact 
seems like a very unpromising basis for a discussion of what is surely a unique set of 
moral situations, situations faced fully only by women.  Thomson’s defense of abortion is 
so restrictive that its plausibility as an argument in “defense of abortion” has become 
problematic.  Those who are pro-choice regarding abortion will want to distance 
themselves from any such defense as Thomson’s on ethical as well as practical grounds. 
It gives up too much, in the wrong ways, and for the wrong reasons. It is not merely that it 
is inadequate and misconceived as a defense.  Rather, it has people thinking about 
abortion in fundamentally misleading and harmful ways.   
Thomson’s defense of abortion begins with a concession that has proved ruinous 
for defenders of choice.  If we start with the assumption that a fetus is a fully-fledged 
person, with all the rights to life that this entails, then a presumption is automatically 
introduced against the intentional killing of any fetus.  The insight that a right to life does 
not entail a right to life-support, even in cases of complete dependence, provides feeble 
support for pro-choice positions.  Thomson’s presumption against the morality of 
abortion plays into the hands, theoretically and practically, of those opposing the right to 
an abortion.  While the anti-abortion movement in the US has had little legislative success, 
until South Dakota, they have been successful in laying the necessary and very real 
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psychological groundwork to such legislation.  What they have done is to create a 
theoretical and practical context in which even those who choose an abortion, and who 
believe and would argue that nothing is immoral in such a choice, are made to feel bad 
about it—are made to feel that they have done something wrong or at least extraordinarily 
regrettable.  It is against this background, and only in this context, that the harsh and 
immoral anti-abortion laws now introduced can hope to succeed. Anti-abortionists have 
won a great victory, though not an ethical one, in enhancing and fostering the guilt, 
misery, regret and false-consciousness of many of those who choose an abortion even 
though there are no ethical grounds for such feelings.  It would be unfair, and a gross 
exaggeration, to lay the blame for this situation on Thomson’s essay.  However, the essay 
has played an unintended role in fostering this situation.  If abortions are thought of as 
killings of individuals with rights to life—as Thomson’s essay accepts and therefore 
reinforces—then it is easy to portray abortion as an intrinsically guilt-inducing business.  
 
II. Thomson’s Defense of Abortion 
 
Thomson likens the case quoted at the beginning of this essay—being kidnapped 
and having the violinist plugged into you—to a case of pregnancy by rape.  Does the fetus 
have a right to life in such a case? Like those in South Dakota, she does not think that the 
fact of rape affects the right to life.  “Surely the question of whether you have a right to 
life …. shouldn't turn on the question of whether or not you are the product of a rape. And 
in fact the people who oppose abortion on the ground I mentioned [the right to life of the 
fetus combined with the view that this right trumps other lesser rights] do not make this 
distinction, and hence do not make an exception in case of rape” (49). 
Thompson argues that the “extreme view”—“the view that abortion is 
impermissible even to save the mother's life … does not issue from the … [right to life of 
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a fetus] without the addition of some fairly powerful premises” (50).6  In the case where a 
mother’s life is threatened and the only way to save the mother is to abort the fetus, then, 
as Thompson argues, unless one assumes that the fetus’s right to life is greater than the 
mother’s, or some other objectionable premises are supposed, abortion may be 
permissible.  Even if one accepts the view that the right to life of the fetus may override 
other less important rights, it is in no way obvious that the fetus’s right should override 
the mother’s own right to life. This takes care of the “extreme” view, but it does nothing 
to support the permissibility of abortion in other extreme cases—rape for example—nor 
in any case where the mother’s life is not threatened.  In these cases it seems on the face 
of it that the fetus’s right to life might often win out. It is not at all obvious how the 
permissibility of abortion where the mother’s life is at risk can be broadened to 
encompass morally permissible abortion in non-life threatening situations. 
Thomson’s famous analogies are introduced to do this work.  They are meant 
facilitate or justify the move from the permissibility of abortion in the extreme case to 
cases where the mother’s life is not at stake. Thomson (55) says 
 
In some views having a right to life includes having a right to be given at least the 
bare minimum one needs for continued life. But suppose that what in fact is the 
bare minimum a man needs for continued life is something he has no right at all to 
be given? If I am sick unto death, and the only thing that will save my life is the 
cool touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on my fevered brow, then all the same, I 
have no right to be given the touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on my fevered 
brow.  It would he frightfully nice of him to fly in from the West Coast to provide 
it. It would he less nice, though no doubt well meant, if my friends flew out to the 
West Coast and carried Henry Fonda back with them. But I have no right at all 
against anybody that he should do this for me. 
 
                                                 
6 Here are the objectionable premises: “(1) But as directly killing an innocent person is always and 
absolutely impermissible, an abortion may not be performed. Or, (2) as directly killing an innocent person 
is murder, and murder is always and absolutely impermissible, an abortion may not be performed.' Or, (3) 
as one's duty to refrain from directly killing an innocent person is more stringent than one's duty to keep a 
person from dying, an abortion may not be performed. Or, (4) if one's only options are directly killing an 
innocent person or letting a person die, one must prefer letting the person die, and thus an abortion may not 
be performed.” (176). 
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Thomson is right about Fonda.  Is this lack of a right to his cool hand analogous to cases 
of pregnancy/abortion?  Henry Fonda is a stranger to Thomson.  He is nobody’s mother—
and no amount of precautionary birth control on any mother’s part will turn her 
analogously into Henry or any of the other Fonda’s.  There are connections between the 
mother and fetus that simply do not exist between Henry and Thomson.  However, 
Thomson summarily rejects any alleged special relation between mother and fetus 
constituted by pregnancy.  She says “It may be said that what is important is not merely 
the fact that the fetus is a person, but that it is a person for whom the woman has a special 
kind of responsibility issuing from the fact that she is its mother .… Surely we do not 
have any such "special responsibility" for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly 
or implicitly” (65).  What constitutes implicitly or explicitly assuming responsibility is a 
point at issue, but it is not the only one. For even if a case cannot be made for supposing 
the mother to have assumed any such responsibility, there may be other reasons to 
advance such a view of her responsibility.  These may perhaps be grounded non-
circularly in the nature of the relation between mother and fetus, even taking into account 
the mother’s right to her body and what happens to it. 
The anti-abortionist can claim the infant’s prima facie right to life is linked to the 
bare minimum needed to survive and will override even severe conflicts of rights and 
inconveniences that may occur in seeing to it that this minimum is granted. They are 
likely to say that, without access to the minimum, the fetus’s right to life is empty or 
meaningless.  Such access is constitutive of the right in this case.  Even in the case of rape, 
adoption is possible and so nothing more than the bare minimum may have to be rendered.  
Thomson says that the violinist who is plugged in to you has “no right against you that 
you should give him continued use of your kidneys” (55) although he needs them to 
survive.  But for one who thinks that the right to life is more important than other rights 
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this does not follow. And even if one does agree that the violinist has no such right 
against you, it is not clear that one can argue successfully by analogy that a fetus has no 
such right against the mother—even perhaps if the fetus is there as a result of rape—and 
more so if the fetus is there as result of willing sex, whether or not one used contraception.  
(Thomson allows the fetus may have a claim if contraception was not used since this is 
tantamount to explicitly or at least implicitly “inviting” the fetus in.) What in the world, 
the anti-abortionist asks, does the violinist case have to do with pregnancy?  The violinist 
is no less a stranger to you than Henry Fonda.  And abortion—as John Finnis argues 
graphically —is not an unplugging (Finnis, 1973).  The analogy of the violinist has 
proved fertile ground for anti-abortionist reconception.  The point, then, that Thomson 
can make through these analogies is only a very general and abstract claim about the logic 
of rights.  Her analogies are not materials for compelling arguments by analogy; they are 
illustrations of general points about rights whose relevance to the case of abortion is far 
from clear and is highly controversial. 
Thomson argues that if the fetus can be removed from the womb viably, then 
abortion would not be warranted given the fetus’s right to life.  However, many opting for 
an abortion do not want the fetus to live even if it could do so independently of the 
mother. If medical advances allowed us to remove the fetus from the mother’s body 
shortly after conception and raise them to an artificial birth and beyond, many women 
would not want this to occur.  They would still regard the fetus and the person it grows 
into as in a sense their child—a child they did not want. Here too Thomson’s view is 
extraordinary for one who is seeking to defend the morality of abortion beyond the case 
where a mother’s life is at stake.  She says, “while I am arguing for the permissibility of 
abortion in some cases, I am not arguing for the right to secure the death of the unborn 
child. It is easy to confuse these two things in that up to a certain point in the life of the 
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fetus it is not able to survive outside the mother's body; hence removing it from her body 
guarantees its death. But they are importantly different …. The desire for the child’s death 
is not one which anyone may gratify, should it turn out to be possible to detach the child 
alive” (66). This view suggests that as medical science and viability of the fetus outside 
the mother’s body advances, the number of morally permissible abortions will dwindle to 
nothing.  It also suggests that Thomson misunderstands a large part of the motivation for 
abortion. It is not only or primarily the inconvenience of the pregnancy the person who 
wants an abortion is objecting to. That may bother them only a little or not at all.  It is 
having someone alive, at that time in their lives, who stands in that relationship to them of 
child to mother—and this concern is not reducible to a concern about the prospect of 
caring for a child.   
Thompson’s arguments from analogy have gone some way to convincing 
generations of women that to the extent they engage in voluntary unprotected sex they 
may be responsible for a fetus such that aborting it is probably immoral.  She considers 
the view that unprotected sex is like “inviting” the fetus to the use of one’s body—in 
which case it has a right not to be aborted. She says “this argument would give the unborn 
person a right to its mother's body only if her pregnancy resulted from a voluntary act, 
undertaken in full knowledge of the chance a pregnancy might result from it” (58).  But, 
she says “there are cases and cases, and the details make a difference” (58). Finally we 
get to screen mesh windows and also to just how utterly circumscribed Thomson’s 
alleged defense of abortion is—how very few cases it applies to.  
Here is the central analogy employed by that Thomson. 
 
“If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar climbs 
in, it would be absurd to say, "Ah, now he can stay, she's given him a right to the 
use of her house—for she is partially responsible for his presence there, having 
voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full knowledge that there are such 
things as burglars, and that burglars burgle" …. Again, suppose it were like this: 
people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one 
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may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, 
so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As 
can happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the 
screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who 
now develops have a right to the use of your house? Surely not—despite the fact 
that you voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept carpets and 
upholstered furniture, and you knew that screens were sometimes defective” (59). 
  
 
But suppose one is plain careless, even utterly careless, as in the vast majority of cases no 
doubt. Then appears to hold Thomson that one is responsible and baring other overriding 
morally relevant features, an abortion is morally impermissible. Thomson says “It seems 
to me that the argument we are looking at can establish at most that there are some cases 
in which the unborn person has a right to the use of its mother's body, and therefore some 
cases in which abortion is unjust killing” (59). But it is not just some cases she is talking 
about.  It is most cases. What does Thomson think the failure rate on properly used 
contraception is? For it is almost exclusively to cases of such failures that her defense 
applies. One might argue about whether this does pertain to the vast majority of cases, but 
Thomson would presumably say that if it does then so be it.  Her aim, after all, is not to 
argue that abortion is always or usually permissible but to determine the conditions under 
which it might be morally permissible.  And on her account, in affluent countries, they 
turn out to be a minority of cases. 
 
III. Anti-abortionism: Prejudice, Vilification and Hate 
 
In the tradition of Analytic Philosophy, Thomson’s article is thoroughly dialectical.  Her 
aim is primarily directed at certain arguments of anti-abortionists: those that proffer no 
more than an appeal to right to life as a trump card.  To read the essay charitably would 
be to accept this limited aim and recognise the value of refuting what, after all, are a very 
weak set of arguments.  Trouble sets in when highly limited, dialectically focused essays 
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become major position statements.  And this is the tragedy of Thomson’s essay.  It has 
seldom been read as a dialectical sortie against ill-equipped opponents.  It has been read, 
and continues to be read, as an attempted map of the fundamental moral landscape of the 
abortion issue.  The issue is framed in terms of a clash of rights: the right of self-defense 
against the fetus, the right to allow persons to die (though not necessarily with a clear 
conscience) if you have not voluntarily assumed a special responsibility towards them.   
This is a disastrous situation for pro-choice advocates.  It plays into the hands of 
conservative opponents of choice and does so in ways that are completely at odds with 
Thomson’s explicit intentions.  It does so in two ways.  First, as we have already argued, 
it helps frame the debate in terms that are highly circumscribed, ineffectual, and open to 
ready anti-abortionist reply.  Second, and perhaps more significantly, it helps frame the 
debate in terms which provide fertile ground for prejudicial and moralistic prosecution of 
the case against choice.  It is this latter aspect of the fate of Thomson’s paper that we wish 
to examine in this section.    
Thomson’s so-called defense of abortion is secular, and it plays into the hands of 
those anti-pro-choice people who claim to have, in addition to religious grounds, purely 
secular grounds for opposing abortion.  It speaks, after all, of the personhood of the fetus 
and of its rights.  The anti-abortion movement is predominantly religiously inspired.  
However, if the attempt to deny women the right to choose an abortion were made in 
purely religious terms, it should be unacceptable in a free and democratic State.  The 
existence of secular arguments against abortion is therefore central to the feasibility of the 
anti-abortionists cause.   
However, there is more to the extreme, right-wing, religious anti-abortion lobby 
than meets the eye.  The case against choice has been prosecuted by this group with a 
fervour and a sense of moral righteousness, sometimes with murder in the heart and in the 
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hand, that is hard to explain by appeal to motivations generated by either secular or 
religious belief.  To understand the social and psychological phenomenon of extreme, 
sometimes violent, invariably moralistic, opposition and attack on women’s choice, we 
may have to look beyond arguments traded and convictions advanced, to underlying 
motivations and their prejudicial character.  The motivation underlying the anti-choice 
movement may have its source alongside other racial, gender and religious prejudices, all 
of whose function it is to protect one from perceived threats (phantasised or real), 
including one’s own moral, religious, sexual and other shortcomings.  On this view, 
prejudices are fundamentally styles of ego-defense.7  Anti-abortionists may often be 
motivated, not by an effort to save the lives of what they take to be the unborn persons, 
but by garden variety prejudices and hate in an effort to offload perceived shortcomings 
on to a scapegoat “other.”  The anti-abortion movement in the US may be predominantly 
enacting a kind of prejudice, one that functions essentially as racism, religious and ethnic 
prejudice, homophobia, misogyny and a host of other prejudices function.  The 
explanatory value of this hypothesis lies in its power to explain the moralistic fervour of 
the attack on choice: its implacability, its utter inflexibility, and its verbally and 
physically violent character. 
According to our explanatory hypothesis, rabid anti-abortionism is grounded in 
prejudices tailor-made to protect self-images and egos.  The beliefs and feelings (eg. hate, 
disdain, superiority) in question are grounded in prejudices and include those about 
alleged values (freedom, democracy, self-determination, the value of life).  These are 
judged essential to the image and identity of the anti-abortionist religious right, but they 
are often motivated by feelings of moral, sexual and other kinds of inferiority.  Such 
alleged values—false, hypocritical and self-serving—are psychically and politically 
                                                 
7 See Young-Bruehl (1996) for an account of prejudice along these lines. 
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employed as a justification for aggression and domination.  They are in the service of 
ego-protection and offer a variety of character types feelings of enhanced moral (and 
other) superiority.  Prejudices cannot always be finely delineated and the anti-abortion 
legislation in South Dakota is also likely motivated by a degree of racism.  Those that will 
predictably be hurt are those that cannot go elsewhere for an abortion—that is the 
indigenous (Indian) population, and the other non-white and white poor.8 
Invoking prejudice, and the projections and violence it may unleash, is a way of 
protecting oneself against perceived threats. The threats of course need not be, and rarely 
are, external, but are psychically real.  However, if one kind of ego-defence, a particular 
prejudice, becomes untenable for whatever reason, then a host of others may take its place 
and perform more or less the same function. So, if historical circumstances make anti-
black racism untenable in the U.S. for example, violence rooted in other forms of 
prejudice, substituted forms, can quickly be found.  Prejudices are usually over-
determined. And the conditions in which prejudices are situated can conveniently be 
played upon and exacerbated. The Australian government, for example, continues to do 
this in relation to refugees.  It has consistently tried to link the arrival of defenceless boat 
people on Australian shores to a potential terrorist threat to national security. There is 
thus a sense in which racism is not so much about race as it is about psychic defence. 
Race is, at it were, an excuse for racism, and gender or sexuality, an excuse for misogyny 
                                                 
8 “South Dakota has only one abortion provider the Planned Parenthood clinic in Sioux Falls, on the eastern 
side of the state. The clinic serves about 2,000 patients a year, and provides about 800 abortions. Two-thirds 
of its patients are near or below the federal poverty level ($14,000 for a single person), and three-fourths are 
uninsured.  In South Dakota, one in six women aged 15-44 have incomes under the federal poverty level 
and one in seven have no health insurance. According to a 2005 Rural School and Community Trust report, 
South Dakotas rural communities have the eighth lowest rural per capita income in the nation, ninth highest 
child poverty rates and sixth highest percentage of rural households headed by women with pre-school age 
children living in poverty. Native Americans, 8.3 percent of South Dakotas population, are among the states 
poorest.  Charon Asetoyer, executive director of the Native American Womens Health Education Resource 
Center on the Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation, told the World, This bill hurts the poorest of the poor. In 
this state, a lot of us fit into that category. Because of federal downsizing and privatization of Indian health 
care, she said, Native Americans increasingly have to travel to the Planned Parenthood clinic for 
reproductive complications and abortions.” People’s Weekly World Newspaper Online, 03/09/06 Author 
Susan Webb.  
suewebb@pww.org. 
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or homophobia.  The issue of abortion represents, we believe, an excuse for the exercise 
of a type of prejudice and ego-defense: the self-righteous indignation of those who seek to 
deny others and the right to opposing moral views.  
This brings us back to this paper’s thesis.  How does Thompson’s essay fare in 
this highly charged and prejudicial environment?  The essay frames the abortion issue in 
terms of a clash of rights.  However, rights talk operates at more than one level.  When 
we introduce a class of rights, we have an effect on moral imagination as well as on 
explicit moral discourse.  To imagine a right is to encourage the kinds of imaginative 
identification which provide prejudicial processes vast expressive resources.  Rights talk 
ups the ante in an obvious and dramatic way.  Failure to respect a right is imagined, not as 
an impermissible action, but as an act of moral violence.  Rights are violated.  The rights 
of the purely innocent are violated doubly.  Today, moralistic outrage exploits the 
language of rights in ways that earlier generations exploited the language of evil.  And 
where this outrage is cover for prejudice, the language not only implies moral violence, 
its use becomes a kind of violence: the verbal violence of those who assault women with 
accusations of unnumbered killings.  
If we are right about the underlying prejudicial character of the anti-abortion 
movement, then the abortion debate is not really functioning at a rational level.  What 
rational debate can inadvertently do—and we think Thomson’s famous essay has done—
is help legitimate rhetoric that expresses prejudicial psychological processes, processes 
that are largely immune to the force of a philosopher’s arguments.  When we discuss 
abortion in terms of a clash of rights, we have already lost the debate at a motivational 
level.  When we use images of kidnapped violinists and people seeds infesting the carpet, 
and giant babies crushing women in small houses (Thomson 52)—images that have 
absolutely nothing specific about women and their moral experience in them—we have 
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lost sight of what is important in the question.  The opponents of choice don’t listen to the 
argument.  They latch hold of the idea that abortion is killing a person with a right to life 
and this gives them the appearance of common ground on which to rant about the killing 
of innocents.  This is the risk with philosophical intervention in prejudice-driven debate.  
Prejudices have to understood, defused, worked around.  Arguments are often enough just 
not effective ways of combating prejudice.  Ill-framed arguments in defense of abortion, 
like those propounded so memorably in Thomson’s essay, can make the situation worse. 
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